The Great Recession and New U.S. Automobile Employment Norms: Financial Rationale in the ‘Employment Grey Zone’ by Kesselman, Donna
 
Revue Interventions économiques
Papers in Political Economy 
58 | 2017
Les zones grises du travail
The Great Recession and New U.S. Automobile
Employment Norms: Financial Rationale in the
‘Employment Grey Zone’
La Grande Récession et de nouvelles normes d’emploi dans l’industrie automobile











Donna Kesselman, « The Great Recession and New U.S. Automobile Employment Norms: Financial
Rationale in the ‘Employment Grey Zone’ », Revue Interventions économiques [Online], 58 | 2017, Online
since 15 May 2017, connection on 16 March 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/
interventionseconomiques/3526  ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/interventionseconomiques.3526 
This text was automatically generated on 16 March 2020.
Les contenus de la revue Interventions économiques sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la 
Licence Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International.
The Great Recession and New U.S.
Automobile Employment Norms:
Financial Rationale in the
‘Employment Grey Zone’
La Grande Récession et de nouvelles normes d’emploi dans l’industrie automobile




1 The  article  studies  the  difficult  process  of  normalization  of  the U.S.  automobile
employment relationship at a time of industrial crisis and unprecedented intervention
of  the  state  in  2009,  during  the  Great  Recession.  In  the  context  of  rare  tripartite
parlays,  the  state  became  a  direct  actor  in  industrial  relations,  and  notably  by
conveying financial rationale. The consequences of workplace relations and workers’
home lives challenged the auto workers union in its role and purpose, and impacted the
new sociopolitical compromise codified in 2015 contracts.
2 In  Detroit  3  automobile  firms  one  may  still  refer  to  a  standard  employment
relationship,  at  least  until  the  period  in  question,  given  regulated  internal  labor
markets,  implicit  promise  of  promotion  and  job  security.  In  the  U.S.  bipartite,
company-based  collective  bargaining  and  revenue  redistribution  model,  where  the
state normally plays an indirect and minimalist role (Kesselman, 2007), we contend that
the United Auto Workers Union (UAW) itself, given its negotiating force and traditional
inter-generational solidarity, is a component of the standard employment relationship.
Thus  in  the  era  of  globalization,  the  union  incorporates  its  major  contradictions.
Constrained by historical circumstances and striving for renewed legitimacy, as both
advocates of immediate demands and spearhead of longer-term needs, such as ensuring
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workers’ social benefits, the union confronts these challenges in a 21st century labor
market that is not, at the present time, a coherent system.
3 Employment relationship changes occurring at contractual “boundaries”, perceived in
generational terms, undermined the single employment norm in automobile. Two-tier
career paths introduced lower wage-scales and benefits for entry-level workers. At the
other  extreme,  retirees  no  longer  enjoy  the  same  health-care  system  as  active
employees, since the introduction of the VEBA, the Voluntary Employees’ Beneficiary
Association.  This  independent  trust  fund,  a  new  actor  in  U.S.  industrial  relations,
changes the nature of employee benefits that are henceforth de-linked from employers
and market-based. 
4 Industry restructuring during the Great Recession enhanced paradoxical dynamics in
U.S. automobile industrial relations. The UAW, the collective bargaining representative
of workers had also become, since the 2007 contract, manager of the VEBA trust. As a
state-mandated  condition  for  the  2009  corporate  bailout  the  VEBA  trust  became
shareholder in the capital of GM and Chrysler, thus repositioning the UAW leadership
with regards to corporate interests. What’s more, the new retiree health-care regime
and second-tier career standards for employees hired after 2007 had dire consequences
for workers from the shop floor to their home lives. These complexities, tensions and
repositioning  of  stakeholders  reflect  employment  norm  transformations  in
globalization.  They  are  processes  that  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  existing,  binary
categories or concepts derived from the Fordist era standard employment relationship.
5 Notions  such  as  precarious  work  or  references  to  “insiders”  or  “outsiders”  do  not
apply. The indeterminations and competing efforts to impact regulatory norms studied
here  create  instabilities  in  work  relations  that  do  not  correspond  to  market
segmentation  theory  (Doeringer,  Piore,  1971).  Workers  resistance  to  maintain  and
restore gains are indications that the historical page of the employment relationship
has not turned (Stone and Arthurs,  2013).  While there is relatively little work done
upon  labor  market  transformations  (Lefresne,  2005),  the  employment  grey  zone
concept  coincides  with Transitional  Labor Market  theory by observing the blurring
between private and professional life boundaries and workers attempts to influence
their career paths. But this approach is mainly aimed at finding public policy solutions
(Gazier and Gautié, 2009). 
6 The “grey zone” perceived here1 expands upon A. Supiot’s definition of the blurring
boundaries between subordination and independent work, whose scope is limited to
the institutional gaps in the realm of labor law (2000). 
7 The  employment  grey  zone  concept  perceives  transforming  employment  norms  in
globalization within an overarching public space. In addition to blurring institutional
boundaries it traces the incessant attempts by stakeholders to redefine work relations
of  power.  When studied at  the closest  level  of  empirical  reality,  the process  of  de-
standardization reveals trends of decline, such as weakening social protections, which
coexist  with  alternative  work  situations  and  worker  lifestyles  (Azaïs,  2016).  These
realities  at  and related to  work,  which are  often un-  or  insufficiently  documented,
cannot be reduced to existing categories or institutions but have yet to fully break
away  to  form any  new  normative  paradigm.  Individual  and  collective  strategies  of
workers help bring structure and meaning to this emerging 21st century labor market. 
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8 This study is based on open-ended interviews that took place in July-August 2013 and
2015  with  workers  and  retirees  in  the  Detroit  3  companies  and  two  parts
manufacturers, and seven middle-level managers at Ford and GM.
9 Detroit 3 restructuring via U.S. state intervention will be the concern of our first part.
We will then study contractual changes in this short yet crucial period, from 2004 to
2015 negotiation rounds, and their consequences for workers of all generations. Finally,
we  will  look  at  how  trends  of “resurgent  Fordism”  and  post-Fordism  combined  to
contribute  to  a  new  sociopolitical  compromise  in  Detroit  3  automobile,  and  how
workers’ strategies affected the outcome. 
 
1. The State as Vector of Grey Zone 
10 Tripartite negotiations took place in Washington in 2009 to bail out an industry facing
the sharpest decline in production and sales since World War II, down over one third in
just two years, especially for the Detroit 32 whose U.S. market share had slid from 50%
to 44% in the same period, before confronting a cyclical downturn of sales and credit
crisis (Klier and Rubenstein 2013). Such state intervention is exceptional in the United
States.  It  occurred  at  the  critical  juncture  of  a  period  extending  from  collective
bargaining  negotiations  in  2004 and  2007  that  introduced  employment  norm
transformations to the new sociopolitical consensus reached in 2015 contracts. It was
one of state interventions the world over to ward off financial crisis and that affected,
in particular, the European model of social dialogue (IRES, 2013). This context helps
explain the concessions the auto workers union made in the name of saving jobs and
under state injunction. 
11 The 2007 Detroit 3 collective bargaining contracts had marked a historical turn due to
the two major concessions made: the introduction of the two-tier career scale and the
UAW’s acceptance to take over management of  the VEBA (Sauviat,  2008).  Since the
government’s first Chrysler bailout in 1979 the UAW, previous trendsetter for workers’
gains  in  American  manufacturing,  took  the  lead  in  attempting  to  limit  their loss
through  “concession  bargaining”  (Lichtenstein,  1995;  Katz  et  al.,  2013).  The  2007
contracts  took  the  trend  to  a  qualitatively  new  stage  by  undermining  the  single
employment norm in automobiles: a downgraded career scale for new entry workers,
regarding wages and benefits; the UAW management of the VEBA. First introduced in
2004  but  managed  by  the  companies3,  the  VEBA  established  a  distinct  healthcare
regime for retirees,  previously beneficiaries of  the more generous active employees
plan. Henceforth managed by the UAW meant de-linkin) this previous form of social
redistribution from employers. Other concessions were made but did not go as far as
management had proposed in the face of resistance, notably strikes at GM and Chrysler.
4 
12 The  Detroit  Free  Press  wrote  that  the  union  takeover  of  the  VEBA was  the  “biggest
concession since the beginning of concession bargaining”. Companies accepted to pay
the VEBA the sums corresponding to their liabilities for retiree healthcare as a means
of eradicating this debt from their accounting. Officially independent according to tax
law, with five out of eleven governing trustees coming from the union, including its
main officers, and the others named by the courts, it’s the UAW which actually assumed
the management of attributing this essential social benefit (Klier and Rubenstein, 2012.
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13 The  2008  stock  market  crash  placed  bailing  out  the  auto  industry  in  the  U.S.,  as
elsewhere, on the agenda. The Obama administration, through an ad hoc task force,
imposed tough terms on GM and Chrysler as conditions for receiving public loans, Ford
deciding to go it alone. Cerberus Capital Management, a private equity investment firm,
then owned Chrysler and its financial services branch for auto loans to consumers, as
well as that of General Motors, GMAC.5 The task force members, mostly Wall Street and
private equity firm’s executives and lawyers with experience in restructuring troubled
companies,  was  headed  by  Steve  Rattner,  prominent  investment  banker,  whose
nomination was contested by Michigan elected officials and trade unionists, due to his
lack  of  experience  in  the  automobile  industry  (Ingrassia,  2011 :229;  Vlasic,  2011:
337-338;  Klier  and  Rubenstein,  2012).  The  task  force  rejected  the  firms’  initial
restructuring  plans,  demanding  tougher  conditions  “to  become  financially  viable”
(Klier  and Rubenstein,  2013)  that  were  endorsed  by  the  Obama administration and
Congress: cut indebtedness by two thirds; lower production costs to those comparable
to  foreign  automaker  competitors  manufacturing  in  the  U.S.  called  transplants;
financing the VEBA not from company payments but by receiving equity in New GM
and New Chrysler after restructuration (Vlasic, 2011, pp. 330-342; Ingrassia, 2011; White
House, 2009).
14 The extent of concessions called for led to an impasse, especially refused by financial
fund creditors, resulting in bankruptcy (Klier and Ruberstein, 2012). According to the
New York Times, “By pushing the matter into bankruptcy court, the [Obama]
administration is assuming that the judge will also reject the holdouts’ demands” (1
May 2009). Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code allows company protection from
creditors while restructuring, including the possibility to reject or modify collective
bargaining agreements, under control of the judge. In this case, the latter replaced the
federal government by requiring the same conditions. To facilitate a rapid exit from
bankruptcy,  the  task  force  employed a  rarely  used measure  under  which “a  newly
formed  company  would  buy  the  desirable  assets  from  the  bankrupt  entity  and
immediately  begin  operating  as  a  solvent  operation”  (Rattner  quoted  in  Klier  and
Ruberstein, 2012: 40).
15 The  two  “new”  firms,  restructured  in  less  than  two  months,  pocketed  the
unprecedented sum of $85 billion in public loans. As for the new automobile contracts:
pay  freeze  for  workers,  elimination  of  contractual  overtime  pay  and  lost  bonuses,
suspension of the cost of living adjustments (COLA) and of Job Bank remuneration (full
pay for temporary laid-off workers),  six-year contracts including a no-strike pledge.
Thousands  of  layoffs  and  factory  closures  were  planned.  Despite  its  not  entering
bankruptcy, Ford received the same concessions in its contract (Katz et al., 2013).
16 The two firms were partially nationalized: the U.S. government became 60.8% owner of
General Motors and Canada, 10%. As for Chrysler, the two governments became part-
owners, but especially imposed a partnership with the Italian automaker Fiat (Ratner,
2010). The most innovative – and controversial – feature was the role of the VEBA: the
fund becomes 17.5% owner of General Motors and 67.7% owner of Chrysler. According
to government dictated terms, the cash liabilities promised in 2007 to finance the VEBA
were reduced and payment would be made in the form of company stock in the two
new firms (White House, 2009; Vlasic, 2011).
17 Thus, the automobile workers union, through the intermediary of the retiree health
insurance trust  that  it  managed,  fund now financed by automobile  company stock,
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became in fact owner – majority owner in the case of Chrysler – of the two firms. As the
UAW president stated at the time, if Chrysler goes bankrupt – a possible, if not probable
scenario – that would be 67% of “0”. A VEBA trustee entered the board of directors of
each firm (Rattner, 2011; Goolsbee and Krueger, 2015). 
18 In January 2010 the independent UAW-VEBA was launched. In 2011, Fiat purchased the
stake owned by the governments and in January 2014 bought out the UAW-VEBA shares
to become the new,  fully  independent firm Fiat  Chrysler  Automobiles,  FCA.  By end
2014,  the U.S.  government had sold on the market  its  remaining shares  of  General
Motors. 
 
1.1 Social Dialogue à l’américaine?
19 U.S.  state  intervention  was  among  those  worldwide  to  stem  the  Great  Recession.
Several studies compare tripartite driven policy responses to the crisis (ILO and World
Bank, 2012) and in Europe, more specifically, the efficacy of government social dialogue
in associating workers to the conduct of public or corporate policies (IRES, 2013). While
included in the ILO/WB reports, the U.S. was absent from the part dealing with social
dialogue. However, the tripartite parlays did take place and can be likened to social
dialogue that took place in Poland, Serbia, Latvia, Montenegro, the Russian Federation,
Indonesia or even Spain where, writes the report, despite consultation and sometimes
common proposals, “governments’ unilateralism prevailed”. 
20 Is the U.S. tripartite experience comparable to European-brand social dialogue? This
would  counter  Freeman’s  view  of  systemic  differences:  “The  EU  model  uses  social
dialogue institutions to help determine economic outcomes, particularly in the labor
market, whereas the U.S. relies more on market forces” (Freeman, 2006). Certainly, the
U.S.  has  no  formal  mechanisms  of  social  dialogue  as  in  much  of  Europe,  with  the
notable exception of Germany. But the exceptional 2009 parlays can be likened as well
to those in this country, included in the IRES report, where “all three stakeholders”
related to each other at the federal level.6 What’s more, there is no fixed definition for
social dialogue, often accepted as all forms of exchange, be it company-based bipartite
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or tripartite, and the national democratic nature of European Social Dialogue has been
challenged on several grounds (Dufresne and Pernot, 2013; Ghellab et al., 2011).
21 The U.S. parlays did aim to determine the outcome of labor market forces. Much is
made,  with  regards  to  the  2009  bailout,  of  the  U.S.  government  “going  into  the
automobile business”, but less attention is paid to its targeted intervention to impact
employment norms, to the point of dictating auto contract clauses. It should be noted
to what extent state action,  through all  three branches of  government – there was
continuity between outgoing and incoming Presidents, while from different parties, the
legislature  and  the  judiciary  –  undermined  historical  gains  such  as  the  single
employment  norm  and  paved  the  way,  via the  VEBA,  for  recodifying  automobile
employment relations along financial, rather than industrial grounds. 
22 And it  is  financial  logic  that  impelled  the  state  to  engage  in  the  extreme form of
intervention, that of nationalization. Along the same lines the VEBA trust, henceforth
managed by the UAW, incited the union’s  repositioning in  industrial  relations  as  a
social benefits provider; and this through stock market-based defined contributions by
workers,  as  opposed  to  the  previous  norm  of  defined  benefits,  i.e.  pay-as-you-go
redistribution (salaire différé). In addition to the new, downgraded contract terms, these
shifts  aroused  tensions  among  the  UAW’s  henceforth  multiple  constituencies  and
destabilized traditional references shared by auto workers and their union. 
23 In the broader context of crisis that “…set in motion spiraling imbalances and stresses
nearly reaching the whole world” (IRES, 2013: 6), the U.S. state’s attempt to regulate
automobile  industrial  relations,  ended up having the opposite  effect.  The top-down
mandate  to  dismantle  historical  gains  and  reorient  others  onto  financially  based
grounds  created a  space  of  indeterminations  that  extended from the  shop floor  to
workers home lives, one which would only be sorted out in the 2015 Detroit 3 contract
negotiations. In this way the state, itself, became a vector of employment grey zone
(Bisom-Rapp and Coiquaud, 2017).
 
2. Transformations at Employment Relation
“Boundaries” 
24 Changing employment norms in a context of economic and industrial collapse fueled
workers’  concerns  for  their  jobs  and  family  well-being,  and  unsettled  workers’
psychological “contract” (Stone, 2001). The adaptations of, mostly young, second-tier
workers – those hired after 2007 – to their downgraded career path will be studied at
several  levels:  shop  floor  relations,  work  organization,  impact  on  home  lives  and
lifestyle expectations. Retirees’ lives were greatly affected by the new, controversial
actor providing healthcare benefits: one that weakens the labor movement for some, or
potentially renews it, for others. 
 
2.1 The Plight of Second-Tier Workers
25 Wages cut to 14 dollars an hour for new hires, about half the industry standard, created
shop floor divisions based on material interest.7Cutbacks for those not yet hired rather
than for existing workers was a convenient way to lower labor costs within what U.S.
automakers increasingly perceived not as a national, but North American continental
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market (Babson, 2004). Second-tier auto workers also receive less favorable healthcare
and retirement plans than the pre-2007 first tier, or “legacy” workers: individual stock-
market  investment accounts  for  retirement (401k accounts)  in  lieu of  the company
pension fund and a lesser health plan. 
26 Two-tier hires occurred simultaneously with Great Recession layoffs, all parts of the
industry’s decade of “unprecedented restructuring”. From its peak in the year 2000 of
1.6 million jobs, 600,000 were left 10 years later, with a majority lost previously in 2007,
and 30% more jobs lost by 2009. Most were “buyouts” – workers receiving packages for
leaving – often early retirement. Michigan was the hardest hit, accounting for 112 plant
closures between 2004 and 2010 – 25% of those existing in 1979 –, among which 37 in
Wayne County, surrounding Detroit (Eberts, 2012; Klier and Rubenstein, 2012). Closures
occurred even despite contractual commitments made by companies, which helped to
fuel  a  “culture of  suspicion and constant worry” (Vlasic,  2011:338)  and weaken the
union as a countervailing shop floor power. General Baker, historical leader of Black
autoworkers in Detroit, told us in an August 2013 interview: 
“Industrial workers so far are scared to death. They don’t know which way to turn...
All they know is the cyclical economic downturns where the industry gets hit, they
get laid off, but then they get back again. So it doesn’t really slap them with the fact
that some of these are permanent losses. So their response is still weak.”
27 In  the  years  following  the  bailout,  news  headlines  worldwide  proclaimed  that  the
Detroit 3 had “renewed with job creation”.8The 2011 Detroit 3 contracts announced job
creations but at the same time continued buyouts for first-tier workers. In 2016, the
U.S.  government announced the auto industry’s  addition of  more than 300,000 jobs
since  the  2009  bankruptcies  (White  House,  2016).  This,  however,  is  not  a  zero-sum
game: it transforms employment norms towards lower-paid jobs, and at numbers far
from peak levels. 
28 The  climate  on  the  shop  floor  was  one  of  tensions  that  were  predictable,  if  not
intentional  (Lallement,  2010),  especially  among  workers  doing  the  same  job  but  at
different pay scales. One second-tier worker at GM commented that tensions among
first-  and  second-tier  workers  were  constantly  present  though  often  remaining
“unsaid”: “On the shop-floor there’s resentment and divisions, people try to downplay
it but it does exist.” Reactions among two-tier workers were varied, including mixed
feelings.  Some are quite critical:  “The tier-ones are just  thinking about themselves,
they voted the contract and then tell you ‘you’re just lucky to have jobs’, they sound
like conservatives”. Some come to earn a living while their mindset is turned towards
personal lives. Still others try to understand the dilemmas such as Scott, who confided
in 2013 that this was his first interview: 
The  senior  members,  they  felt  like  they  were  broken,  they  had  given  a  lot  of
concessions,  were  afraid  and  weren’t  sure  that  the  Chrysler  turnaround  would
work. I sympathize with them, but is that a reason to punish us, the new people
who are just trying to feed our families? 
29 Some second-tier workers joined the UAW dissident opposition that gained ground in
opposing both the two-tier system and the VEBA and ran an opposition candidate for
union President in 2010 against the traditional UAW leadership caucus, an exceptional
occurrence in the UAW.9Many engaged in alternative and creative initiatives. The social
media was widely used, be it for demonstrations of unity among both tier workers, or
opposition, or discussion forums where all opinions could be expressed, such as Scott’s
Facebook association which had over 500 members: “People talk about business within
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the plant, hours, frustrations, exchanges about the human aspect or relations between
workers and with the union. They’re being treated like dirt by management, by senior
union Brothers and Sisters, but ya shouldn’t generalize, there are also lots of solidarity
and sympathy.” 
30 The instrumentalization of  divisions by management leaves no doubt.  For example,
regarding  work  time,  after  contractual  elimination  of  overtime  pay  each  firm
restructured schedules to avoid paying federally mandated overtime time and a half –
150%  –  over  a  40-hour  week.  “Alternative  Work  Schedules”  at  Chrysler  consist  of
grueling ten-hour shifts over seven-day periods, with changing schedules and days off
to  meet  weekly  production needs  without  overtime pay.  Management  intentionally
separates first- and second-tier workers into different shifts to nurture divisions. 
31 The lower wage scale and worsening working conditions transformed automobile from
the  hallmark  of  the  country’s  blue-collar  middle  class,  to  a  low-wage  industry.
Expectations  for  the  middle-class  lifestyles  that  second-tier  worker  parents  had
enjoyed dwindled, literally,  from one day to the next.  The hourly rate at $14 totals
$30,000 a year. For the Family Resource Simulator it takes $40,000 a year for a two-
parent family with two children to afford basic necessities in Detroit.10 
32 Declining employment norms and divisions among workers thus eroded what in the
U.S.  model  was  the  shop floor  locus  of  power  (Brody,  1993)  and had consequences
extending towards the community. 
 
2.2 The VEBA: a New and Controversial Industrial Relations Actor
33 How  have  automobile  retirees  fared  with  the  new  healthcare  system?  This  will  be
explored first. Then we will see the hopes placed in the VEBA as a source of renewal.
34 The VEBA drew retiree criticism from the start. Out-of-pocket expenses were required
for  the  first  time,  drug costs  rose,  dental  and vision coverage was  eliminated.  The
administrative bureaucracy was exasperating: “We thought it would be better because
the union is for the workers but it’s worse than an insurance company.” 
35 One delegate at the 2010 UAW convention stated:
In 2007 we were told that the VEBA would be strong for 85 years when, in fact, we
need investment return on VEBA assets, high value of company stock to make the
required  contributions.  Rising  prices  with  medical  inflation  and  increasing
prescription costs put a huge burden on retirees with multiple prescriptions.11
36 Doug told us that, in answer to his question at a UAW retiree meeting, “How many
people are raising grandchildren?” almost everybody raised their hands. They referred
to either day care, helping or living with them, and many had their adult children back.
Young adults living at home has grown in the U.S., due to factors such as lower wage
scales and Great Recession consequences,12 weighing especially upon those, like current
generation automobile retirees, who enjoy comfortable pensions. The encounter with
Doug took place after reading a poignant open letter he had placed on the internet
explaining how he and his wife had been obliged to adopt their grandchildren for them
to qualify as dependents receiving healthcare under the UAW-VEBA.13 
37 While the number of VEBAs has grown since a 1993 tax law change14, they tend to be
associated  with  bankruptcy.  Many  function  as  planned  but  those  that  fail  receive
visibility  in  the  press,  such  as  the  UAW  negotiated  trust  at  Caterpillar  that  was
The Great Recession and New U.S. Automobile Employment Norms: Financial Ratio...
Revue Interventions économiques, 58 | 2017
8
underfunded and went under in 2005 or the one at auto-parts supplier Detroit Diesel
(Ghilarducci 2010). Consequences for workers caught in the middle have been dramatic,
as retirees and union officers at one Detroit Diesel Local Union told us in summer 2015.
The  company  had  won  upon  appeal,  reversing  a  lower  court  decision  in  favor  of
retirees  based  on  written  commitments  previously  given  to  the  union:  it  refused
responsibility to pay retiree healthcare costs once the VEBA was depleted. Exorbitant
costs have forced retirees to live in poverty, renounce healthcare and/or try to find
jobs, if health allows, to make do. 
38 Others perceive the VEBA as a  symbol of  the union renewal.  The tax-exempt,  non-
profit, stock market-based trust for providing employee benefits is promoted as a new
solution for social insurance, one that is de-linked from employers and enjoys greater
assurances of continuity in benefits. One specialist called the VEBA the “New Treaty of
Detroit”, referring to the 1950 UAW-GM accord, symbol of the U.S. contract model. This
potential “…employee benefit of the future [would] help unions attract workers and
employers” (Ghilarducci, 2010: 244; Bernstein, 2008). Through the VEBA, the UAW, aims
to reposition itself in relation to Detroit auto firms, it is “…a tool in its own strategy to
establish labor standards in the industry” (Ghilarducci 2010: 25815).
39 After a rocky start,  the UAW-VEBA has been praised for cutting drug costs,  adding
preventive care and partially restored dental and vision benefits while also increasing
assets.  At  another  level,  it  has  become  an  influential  shareholder  on  corporate
governance issues, pressuring major firms – McDonald’s, Walgreens – towards greater
transparency  in  political  donations,  joint  lobbying  for  lower  drug  and  medical
treatment prices, etc. It is an actor in a growing debate over the progressive role unions
can play, through pension and healthcare funds, as stock markets activists (Bloomberg
Businessweek, 27 Dec. 2015; McCarthy, 2014; Adler and Youngdahl, 2010).
40 Whatever  one’s  view,  the  UAW-VEBA’s  internal  contradictions  remain.  The  trust  is
market-based  and  so  bears  investment  risks.  It  redistributes  resources  available:
benefits are extended or reduced according to stock and bond market values (section
3.5 of trust agreement) and in the case of collapse, no one is responsible for providing
healthcare  to  UAW  retirees  (section  6.5).  The  VEBA’s  estimated  worth  dropped  by
almost half by May 2009 before rebounding (Automotive News, 13 Oct. 2015).
41 The question of conflict of interest has been raised. The online review Crain’s Detroit
Business praised  the  UAW  president  who  negotiated  the  2007  union  management
takeover of the VEBA from a corporate perspective (28 Sept. 2007): “[Ron] Gettelfinger
and his VEBA are the toast of Wall Street”. In an article entitled, “What Would Walter
Reuther16 Think?  UAW’s  New Direction  Inspires  Visions  of  Hope  and  Disaster,”  the
Detroit Free Press wrote of the conundrum facing the union due to the key role the UAW-
VEBA played in the state stewarded bailout (7 Sept. 2009): “The UAW, through a trust
created to pay for retiree healthcare, has emerged from the chaos with a significant
ownership  stake  in  the  automakers,  even  as  its  membership  sank  to  lows  that
threatened its power. But that ownership stake could align the UAW’s interests more
with the companies – because retirees need the stock to be valuable to pay for their
benefits – over those of workers, who want financial and job security.” In other words,
it’s when companies cutback on jobs and labor costs that stock values rise. The Detroit
Daily pursued: “The UAW Pres. Ron Gettelfinger has said that he doesn’t see a conflict.” 
42 Changes at contractual boundaries have repercussions that pervade the employment
relationship and also extend beyond the workplace. The auto retirees are still part of
The Great Recession and New U.S. Automobile Employment Norms: Financial Ratio...
Revue Interventions économiques, 58 | 2017
9
this relationship through the contract as they receive their source of income from the
company pension fund. While not being able to vote on contracts, active UAW members
negotiate in their name for the contract is the only area where pension improvements
are written. They also negotiate as future retirees themselves: in the 2007 GM contract,
for instance, hourly pay an annual wage increases were sacrificed to help finance the
VEBA. 
43 The UAW, through its organizational roots, collective representation, intergenerational
solidarity  and  sense  of  identity  is  thus  an  integral  component  of  the  employment
relationship in automobile. Contract terms that downgrade social gains for second-tier
autoworkers and auto retirees affect work, family and community relations. In a state
like Michigan, the fate of the automobile industry and collectively bargained contracts
for  autoworkers  are  inseparable  from  the  collapse  of  the  middle-class  and  the
bankruptcy  of  cities,  such  as  Detroit.  Transformations  in  industrial  relations  thus
create a grey zone of interactions and complexities that extends into the public sphere.
 
3. Fordism, Post-Fordism and Social Compromise 
44 Contracts negotiated in 2015 restored social compromise in automobile, a situation that
both depends on and reinforces social  peace (Stewart,  2003:  4).  Their most debated
clauses  –  and  most  unexpected  outcomes  –  concerned  the  two-tier  system  and
healthcare benefits. What can be termed as “resurgent Fordist” and post-Fordist trends
combined to impact the automobile employment relationship, already undermined by a
generation of globalization. 
45 Resurgent Fordism (Bédard, 2016) took the form of workers mobilizing social power
through traditional means – bread-and-butter demands, collective bargaining, contract
votes, strike threats at all three firms17 –. They subsequently obtained wage increases
and  moved  towards  restoring  the  single  career  norm.  Moreover,  a  UAW  proposed
Healthcare  Cooperative  for  active  employees,  presented  as  modeled  after  the  post-
Fordist VEBA, was rejected outright by the membership. In both cases it was rank-and-
file opposition that imposed the results.
46 On 1 October 2015, Fiat-Chrysler (FCA) workers, in a rare occurrence,18 voted down the
first UAW negotiated national contract by an almost two to one margin (65%), despite
substantial pay rises, for it included two-tier workers and the new health-care plan.
The proportion significantly surpasses the 46% of two tiers in the firm, an indication of
renewed, at least at this juncture, inter-generational solidarity. Scott, the second-tier
worker we had met two years earlier, interviewed by the New York Times, bears witness
to  the  view that  the  results  were  unexpected:  “People  feel  like  the  leadership  has
insulted them… We showed we aren’t quite as naïve as they thought” (24 Oct. 2015). For
the  NYT:  “It  was  a  stunning  rebuke  of  the  company and the  UAW leadership,  and
completely altered the course of the talks… and ultimately the cost structures of GM,
Ford and Fiat Chrysler.” 
47 In the renegotiated contract, voted by 77% of FCA workers, entry-level workers would
reach top wage scales after eight years: the two-tier system, if not totally eliminated,
commented Kristen Dziczek, Director of the Center for Automotive Research, started to
be  “phased  out”  (Dziczek,  2016). The  new  healthcare  initiative  for  active  workers,
proposed  by  the  national  union  leadership  but  rejected  by  the  rank-and-file,  was
withdrawn. Ford then GM workers voted their similar contracts, obtaining even higher
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wage gains.19 Autoworkers were intent upon sharing in the industry’s prosperity they
had largely contributed to through sacrifices during a decade of lost wages for legacy
workers. Two-tier wages and the UAW takeover of the VEBA had been the two main
sources of cost cutbacks (Cutcher-Gerschenfeld et al., 2105).
48 This is not the scenario framed at the outset. Observers had underscored the UAW’s
dilemma: closing the wage gap between two-tier members hired after 2007 and the
previously employed legacy workers, while at the same time satisfying the latter’s pay
raise  demands.  Greater  influence  had  been  attributed  to  the  “…forces  outside  the
[negotiation] room” (DFP, 12 July 2015) including: expanding corporate investments in
Mexico and pressures from management and Wall Street to pursue them, recent Right-
to-Work laws in Michigan and Indiana,20 the need to maintain competitive labor costs.21
Of course,  contracts are complex constructions:  the two-tier system was not totally
eliminated,  Ford  and  GM  second-tier  workers  won  healthcare  plans  equivalent  to
legacy workers  but  not  at  FCA and second-tier  social  benefits  continue in all  three
firms,  other  major  concessions  previously  made  for  all  active  workers  were  not
recovered (Dziczek, 2016). Nevertheless, at no time was it assumed in the press that
both  major  rank-and-file  demands,  upgrading  two  tiers  and  pay  hikes  for  legacy
workers, would be obtained. 
49 The outright  rejection of  the  health  cooperative,  presented by  UAW leaders  to  the
rank-and-file  as  modeled  after  the  VEBA (Automotive  News,  25  Aug.  2015),  set UAW
leaders aback. The post-Fordist scheme would have combined the numbers of Detroit 3
active employees and VEBA beneficiaries into one insurance pool,  becoming a more
powerful bargaining force with healthcare providers (insurance companies, hospitals)
for quality,  low-cost healthcare,  such as at the VEBA.22 During the 2015 negotiation
period VEBA accomplishments were lauded in the press, quoting past vocal opponents
who had since taken more positive views. Our own interviews in 2015, even with some
of the same Detroit 3 retirees who had previously been critical, gave similar results. 
50 In  a  letter  to  union  members,  the  UAW  President  framed  the  setback  as  a
communication problem. Yet after campaigning for a VEBA-like system, now insisting
on how the co-op actually differed from the VEBA – there would be no out-of-pocket
payments as in the VEBA, no variation in benefits, etc. – may have just added to the
confusion.23 The announcement  of  a  $20.7  billion VEBAfunding shortfall  during the
period of negotiations, forcing the Trust to trim benefits, was not timely (Wall Street
Journal, 12 Oct. 2015). 
51 Dissidents  campaigned  against  any  change  to  the  traditional,  company  financed
system,  and  among  workers,  there  was  a  blatant  lack  of  trust.  Union  locals  wrote
critical  leaflets  fearing  “hidden  healthcare  costs”  not  revealed  to  members,  while
robust  debates  and  videos  of  union  meetings,  largely  critical  of  the  proposed
cooperative, covered the social media.24 One must add the collective consciousness of
past experience, as the plight of friends and neighbors who are facing hardship due to
failed VEBAs, such as at Detroit Diesel. 
52 The  recurrent  debate  over  “conflict  of  interest”  re-emerged.  For  Gary  Chaison,
professor of Industrial Relations at Clark University: “The UAW is now more involved in
administering  employee  and  retiree  benefits  than  in  bargaining  for  substantial
economic gains…. It presents something of a conflict of interest” (DFP, 16 Sept. 2015).
The Detroit Free Press wrote: “UAW President Dennis Williams made it a priority to help
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the Detroit Three automakers control or reduce healthcare costs,” thereby expressing
the union leader’s concern for company interests (DFP, 8 Oct. 2015).
53 What are the implications of years of ownership of two of the Detroit 3 firms by the
VEBA, given its close and well-known ties with the UAW? Noting as well that during the
2015 negotiations, the UAW-VEBA still owned 8.85% of GM stock and was the company’s
largest share owner? Hindsight is needed to respond to the question raised by the IRES,
as to whether measures taken to face the Great Recession crisis  reflect  momentary
arrangements  within a  particular  context  or  enduring trends,  whether  pre-existing
social relations have been altered and future directions of industrial relations changed
(IRES, 2013).
54 The  same  question  may  be  asked  regarding  modified  cost  structures  that  allowed
companies,  despite  the  unexpected concessions  made,  to  hold  the  line  on costs,  at
levels required by the 2009 bailout (Dziczek, 2016). The government-managed bailout
had introduced new, post-Fordist norms regarding corporate revenue redistribution:
labor costs – wages and benefits – would be based upon neither workers’ productivity,
even less so on workers’ buying power as consumers or the traditional auto reference
to cost-of-living increases (Levy, Temin 2010; Katz, 1987), but determined through the
market-based notion of aligning labor costs to the level of foreign car manufacturer
competitors producing in the United States.25 The discriminating feature of these Asian
and European firms is that they are mostly settled in southern Right-to-Work states, do
not use union labor or bargain collectively and therefore provide significantly lower
benefits26 (Cutcher-Gerschenfeld et al., 2015).
55 Moreover, State action through legislation, since the 1974 ERISA law on pension funds
and the 1993 law on VEBAs, incites the development of trusts as a harbor for workers’
savings  and more risk-taking investments  by trust  managers.  For  S.  Montagne this
“pre-eminence of finance over other institutional forms tends towards the formation of
a new, ‘financialized’ wage-labor nexus (relation salariale) as opposed to that existing
during Fordism” (Montagne, 2008: 222).
56 What is comparable, then, among Great Recession state interventions was not just their
form –  the  state’s  tripartite  parlays  and unilateralism,  while  clothed in  the  Obama
Administration’s prestige enjoyed with Labor – but substance. In the U.S. as elsewhere,
rather  than  upholding  demands  framed  around  workers’  interests,  previously
customary  in  most  European  countries,  public  measures  were  “…focused  on
competitive conditions  for  businesses,  traded  off  for  job  maintenance:  wage
moderation, flexibilized labor markets, changed pension and healthcare rules” (IRES,
2013:9-10).  The  trend  reflects  the  growing  influence  of  the  financial  elite  upon
government policy choices, notably during the global financial crisis (Jessop, 2016), and
supports arguments that the content of European social dialogue has moved towards
neoliberal standards (Dufresne and Pernot, 2013).
57 Ultimately,  the  juncture  of  two  opposing  processes  –  Resurgent  Fordism and Post-
Fordist trends – resulted in social compromise in 2015 contracts: satisfaction of rank-
and-file  demands  through  workers  traditional  means  of  mobilization,  just  as
production  norms  are  transformed  to  corporate  advantage  on  other  grounds.  This
concurs  with  the  hypothesis  of  gradual  institutional  change  (Mahoney  and Thelen,
2010).
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Conclusion
58 A short but crucial period occurred in U.S. automobile industrial relations between the
2004-2007 Detroit 3 contracts that undermined the single employment relationship and
the 2015 negotiation round that reached a new social compromise, but whose longevity
is  unpredictable.  In  the  meantime,  work  relations  comprised  a  disputed  space  of
complexities and indeterminations from the shop floor to community. Accounting for
this  grey  zone and its  dynamics  is  essential  to  understanding the  de-standardizing
employment relationship as an unequal and overarching process that extends into the
public sphere. It includes a degree of wavering as to the nature of union representation.
59 Constrained  by  historical  circumstances,  striving  for  renewed  legitimacy  as  an
advocate of immediate demands in the workplace while attempting to foresee longer-
term needs, the UAW endeavors to be a player in the framing of the 21st century labor
market,  which  is  still  emerging.  It  nevertheless  remains  that  its  flagship  plan  for
providing healthcare, the VEBA, is a stock market trust that enhances financial logic
within transforming employment relationship norms. When specialists at the Economy
Policy Institute, close to the AFL-CIO, promote the VEBA for its ability to provide auto
retirees  “greater  assurances”  of  continuity  of  benefits  (Cutcher-Gershenfeld  et  al.,
2015), the notion of risk overshadows that of social rights. 
60 At the same time corporations test and transgress conventional and contract bounds.
And in the case studied here, government played a direct role in automobile industrial
relations through its attempt to introduce financial rationale into contracts.
61 Workers mobilization helped bring structure and meaning to these competing levels of
regulation,  thereby  reducing  the  employment  grey  zone.  Their  individual  and
collective strategies remain linked, directly or indirectly, to employment and its social
gains, including though worker collective consciousness. The analytical thread of the
grey zone is to what extent globalization, in its many forms and consequences, impacts
the employment relationship and the degree of resilience of the latter. 
62 The automobile workers union, through its organizational roots and inter-generational
solidarity, remains the anchor of the still largely standard employment relationship in
major  U.S.  auto  firms.  The  extraordinary  tripartite  moment  in  2009  essentially
counterposed top-down political injunctions with recomposing worker resistance. Final
contract terms codified a new sociopolitical compromise through traditional means of
collective bargaining. 
63 The employment grey zone concept as a public space (Azaïs, Dieuaide and Kesselman,
2017) is a useful concept for perceiving these processes in terms of employment norms
and their transformations. It accounts for emerging trends at and around work and
how actors negotiate their  interests  in a  global  labor market that has undermined,
though  not  eliminated,  traditional  frameworks  of  social  legitimacy,  be  they  public
institutions or contracts.
64 Like  any  process,  industrial  relations  consensus  is  one  of  complex  and  mediated
relations that  incorporate change and shocks,  counter-movements  and continuities.
This  includes the historical  intricacies of  evolving from one system of  labor-capital
relations to another, the non-linear process of moving towards post-Fordist paradigms
(Lipietz,  1997;  Jessop,  2001).  It  occurs  in  a  21st century  labor  market  that  must  be
understood  in  un-reified  and  non-teleological  terms,  due  to  work  experiences  and
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norms that are in constant motion. They are characteristic of employment grey zones,
whose study as  close as  possible to empirical  reality is  a  promising field of  critical
research.
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1.  The notion “employment grey zone” has been developed in the ANR project, « L’évolution des
normes d’emploi et nouvelles formes d’inégalités ; vers une comparaison des zones grises ? », in
the program theme « Inégalité-Inégalités », 2011-2015.
2.  The term “Detroit 3”, referring to General Motors, Ford and FCA (Fiat Chrysler Automobiles)
has come to replace the previous term “The Big Three” (automobile manufacturers) since Toyota
become the number one world producer of automobiles in 2008.
3.  The VEBA is defined under 501 (C) Section (9) of the U.S. tax code, equivalent to a non-profit
association.  
4.  A two-day strike at some GM plants and a one-day strike at Chrysler. 
5.  After having bought Chrysler in 1998, Daimler sold to Cerberus Capital Management in 2007.
6.  Borrowing from a typology set out by Jacques Freyssinet in a report for the ILO government
on reactions to the crisis, the IRES study adopts its three categories of countries that include
Germany in these terms, while noting that this country lacks a tradition of tripartism or central
government interventionism into industrial relations (Freyssinet, 2012).
7.  The end-career wage levels of $19/hour is two thirds of the $29/hour earned by the first tier,
those hired before 2007 ($15.78-$19.28 in 2015).
8. Les Echos, 3 October 2011, Detroit Free Press, 12 July 2016.
9.  Gary  Walkowitz,  a  Ford  Local  bargaining  committee  man,  ran  for  UAW  president  on  a
dissident slate opposing two-tier contacts and the VEBA. 
10.  The Family Resource Simulator (FRS) is a web-based tool developed by the National Center
for Children in Poverty. http://www.nccp.org/tools/frs/. For the national average threshold for
a family of four in 2015 was 24,250 dollars a year. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
https://aspe.hhs.gov/2015-poverty-guidelines#threshholds. Last consulted 4 August 2016.
11.  Mark Payne, Local 1250, delegate to 35th Constitutional Convention Proceedings, UAW, 14-17
June 2010. Detroit, Michigan, p. 64. 
12.  The number of U.S. young adults living in record numbers with parents reached a record
high in 2014, notes a Pew Center study (Fry, 2016). 
13.  Letter consulted June 2012, interviews August 2013. 
14.  While previously existing in the U.S. tax code, VEBAs spread after a 1993 requirement by the
Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  (FASB)  for  large  companies  to  deduct  retiree  health-
benefit liabilities from reported profits.
15. Teresa Ghilarducci is a renowned specialist of labor and retirement issues and also serves as a
public trustee for the health care VEBAs for United Auto Workers retirees of General Motors,
Ford  Motor  Company  and  Chrysler,  and  United  Steelworkers  retirees  of  Goodyear  Tire  and
Rubber Company. 
16.  Walter Reuther was a founder and historical leader of the UAW.
17.  Workers at GM and FCA had only just recovered the right to strike which had been sacrificed
since 2009 as a condition for the bailout. 
18.  It  was  the  first  time  since  1982  that  UAW  members  rejected  a  national  agreement
recommended by their leaders.
19.  Voting in favour were 55% at GM and 51% at Ford, where the contract seemed headed for
defeat, large locals voting it down 2-to-1 (Dziczek 2016).
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20.  These were the first automobile negotiations since the law was introduced in Michigan in
2012, the same year as in Indiana. 
21.  Main sources during 2015 negotiations: The Detroit Free Press, New York Times, Crain’s Detroit
Business, Automotive News, The Center for Automotive Research (Car), Labor Notes. 
22.  The UAW VEBA covers 607,000 retirees and dependents, to which would be added 140,000
Detroit 3 hourly workers and possibly 150,000 salaried employees. 
23.  Unlike the VEBA there would be no out-of-the pocket payments, benefits would not be de-
linked from employers who would continue to provide healthcare. The UAW’s letter stated: “We
DO NOT want another VEBA… for active auto members. We believe that healthcare should be
provided by the employer.” “A message from UAW President Dennis Williams”, October 5, 2015,
https://uaw.org/a-message-from-uaw-president-dennis-williams/,  last  consulted  18  January
2016.
24.  Of the many Facebook Pages, “UAW Real Talk GM, Ford, FCA”, run by Brian Keller, a FCA
worker, drew more than 1,700 members and is cited by the press.  
25.  The notion of “costs” is used here instead of wages given the U.S. bargaining model where
most social benefits are provided by employers in the same remuneration package as wages.
26.  Et alors qu’en 1978, 82 % de tous les véhicules vendus aux États-Unis et au Canada étaient
produits par des ouvriers syndiqués, ce taux est tombé en 2010 à 50%.
ABSTRACTS
The article  studies the difficult  process  of  normalization of  the U.S.  automobile  employment
relationship at a time of industrial crisis and unprecedented intervention of the state in 2009,
during  the  Great  Recession.  Changes  introduced  at  contractual  “boundaries”,  understood  in
generational terms, undermined the single employment norm: lower wage-scales for entry-level
workers  and  a  distinct  health-care  regime  for  retirees,  through  a  new  actor  in  industrial
relations, the VEBA trust fund. 
It  highlights  the  mounting  influence  of  financial  rationale  in  this  process  of  recodifying
employment norms, both in setting wage standards and through the VEBA, as a market-based
provider of social benefits and the trust’s role in the state-mandated bailout of General Motors
and Chrysler.  The tensions that ensued, from the shop floor to workers’ home lives, challenged
the  union mandate  to  represent  all  workers  and marked the  new sociopolitical  compromise
reached in 2015 contracts. This short but crucial period created an “employment grey zone”, a
theater of confrontations among stakeholders and indeterminations where workers’ individual
and collective strategies proved decisive in how events played out. 
L’article étudie le processus difficile de normalisation de la relation d’emploi dans l’industrie
automobile  aux  États-Unis  au  moment  de  la  crise  dans  l’industrie  et  de  l’intervention  sans
précédent de l’État,  pendant la  Grande Récession de 2009.  Des changements intervenant aux
« frontières » des relations contractuelles, perçus en termes générationnels, ont remis en cause
la norme salariale unique : une grille de carrière inférieure pour les primo entrants et un système
d’assurance maladie spécifique pour les retraités, par l’intermédiaire d’un nouvel acteur dans les
relations professionnelles, la VEBA, un fonds d’investissement en bourse. 
Il  met  l’accent  sur  l’influence  grandissante  de  la  logique  financière  dans  le  processus  de
recodification des normes d’emploi, que cela soit dans l’établissement des normes salariales ou à
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travers la  VEBA,  comme prestataire d’avantages sociaux et  à  cause du rôle du fonds dans le
sauvetage des entreprises, la General Motors et Chrysler, sous l’injonction de l’État. Les tensions
qui en découlent, du lieu du travail jusqu’à la vie familiale des travailleurs, ont soulevé un défi
pour le  syndicat  unique des entreprises,  l’UAW, dans son mandat  qui  consiste  à  représenter
l’ensemble des travailleurs automobiles,  et ont marqué le compromis sociopolitique qui a été
réalisé lors des négociations collectives de 2015. Cette période courte, mais non moins cruciale, a
donné lieu à une « zone grise d’emploi », le théâtre d’indéterminations et de confrontations entre
parties prenantes où les stratégies individuelles et collectives des travailleurs ont joué un rôle
déterminant dans l’issue des événements. 
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